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INTRODUCTION 
The United States patent system is supposed to protect “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof.”1  This language, from Section 
101 of the Patent Act, was historically interpreted to “include anything 
under the sun that is made by man.”2  Recently, however, lower courts 
have invalidated software patents relating to everything from organizing 
digital photographs3 to online restaurant menus.4  They have done so on 
the grounds that the inventions failed to satisfy the requirements of 
Section 101.  Yet photographs, menus, and associated software are all 
clearly “made by man.”  So why aren’t they patentable subject matter? 
The reasons are largely grounded in interpretations of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Alice.5  The Court used Alice as an 
opportunity to expound on the notion that “abstract ideas” are 
unpatentable under Section 101.6  But regrettably, it did so without 
providing meaningful guidelines regarding what it takes for an idea to 
be abstract, and without appreciating the particular difficulties with 
distinguishing abstract ideas from concrete advances in the realm of 
software.  In response, many lower courts have proceeded to apply much 
stricter scrutiny to inventions requiring computer implementation, and 
particularly to inventions embodied within computer programs. 
Historical precedent is helpful in understanding where these courts 
have erred.  Longstanding caselaw recognizes that laws of nature, and 
mathematical expressions thereof, are unpatentable under Section 101.7  
These exceptions were intended to ensure the key “building blocks” of 
scientific development remained free for all mankind to use, thus 
encouraging innovation.  But importantly, mathematical expressions 
were considered unpatentable to the extent they were expressions of a 
law of nature; they were not considered unpatentable in general, or 
unpatentable under Section 101 because they constituted abstract ideas. 
Thus, although computer programs often consist of or contain 
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
3. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
4. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
5. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
6. See id. at 2354 (2014) (“We have long held that this provision contains an important
implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”) 
(quoting Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013)). 
7. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853), subsequent proceedings, Le Roy v.
Tatham, 63 U.S. 132 (1859); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 
91 (1939).  
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mathematical formulas, that alone should not be a basis for finding them 
unpatentable as abstract ideas.  Nonetheless, by broadly wielding the 
“abstract idea” exception to Section 101 to reject computer-implemented 
inventions, modern courts have expanded Section 101’s exceptions well 
beyond their original contours.  These courts seem to have lost sight of 
the distinction between mathematical expressions of laws of nature 
(which are not patentable, to the same extent a law of nature is not 
patentable) and other mathematical formulas and algorithms that are 
made by man (such as most computer software programs, which should 
be just as patentable as other processes made by man). 
This article examines the early development of Section 101 
jurisprudence, which began with a focus on the “building blocks” of 
innovation.  We then consider how the addition of the “abstract ideas” 
exception, and in particular the Federal Circuit’s interpretation thereof, 
has vastly and improperly restricted the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter.  To restore a balance to Section 101 that will encourage 
innovation while still protecting the true building blocks of scientific 
development, we propose that courts should return to the roots of Section 
101, rejecting only those patents truly based on laws of nature and 
mathematical expressions thereof.  All other inventions made by man—
including computer software—should be allowed as patent-eligible 
subject matter. 
I. HISTORICAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
DOCTRINE
The text of Section 101 does not identify any exceptions to patent-
eligible subject matter.  There are, however, judicially-created 
exceptions.  Although the precise boundaries of these exceptions have 
been formulated in different ways over the years, Alice identified three 
main categories of exceptions: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.8  In defining these exceptions, Alice relied on Bilski v. 
Kappos,9 a Supreme Court decision from 2010. Bilski, in turn, relied on 
cases defining exceptions to Section 101 “as a matter of statutory stare 
decisis going back 150 years.”10 Understanding the historical logic 
behind these exceptions is essential to understanding where courts have 
gone wrong in applying the “abstract ideas” exception in the context of 
software inventions.  
8. Alice Corp. Pty., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
at 2166). 
9. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010). 
10. Id.
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A. Laws Of Nature Are Not Patentable
The earliest case cited by Bilski in its line of precedent “going back
150 years” was Le Roy v. Tatham,11 decided by the Supreme Court in 
December 1852.  In Le Roy, the Supreme Court carved out the first 
exception to Section 101: laws of nature.  Based on this exception, the 
decision rejected a patent claiming a new method for creating lead pipes 
under heat and pressure, instead of casting the pipes from a mold, as was 
the industry standard at the time.12  
The patentees admitted that they did not claim any particular 
machinery,13 but instead claimed the use of existing machinery in 
combination with a “newly discovered principle, to wit, that lead could 
be forced, by extreme pressure, when in a set or solid state, to cohere and 
form a pipe.”14  
The claim specified: 
We do not claim as our invention and improvement any of the parts 
of the above described machinery, independently of their 
arrangement and combination above set forth. 
What we claim as our invention, and desire to secure by letters-
patent, is, the combination of the following parts above described, to 
wit, 
the core and bridge, or guide-piece, with the cylinder, the piston, the 
chamber and the die,  
when used to form pipes of metal, under heat and pressure, in the 
manner set forth,  
or in any other manner substantially the same.15 
The lead pipes created pursuant to this patent were “much superior 
in quality to that made according to the old mode,” and were also “much 
cheaper,” such that they quickly “wholly superseded” the market.16  Yet, 
even though this discovery was clearly new and useful, the Court 
rejected the patent.   
Looking to the claim language, as stated in the application,17 the 
court found that the patent did not claim patent-eligible subject matter, 
as “a principle is not patentable”.18  The machinery was disclaimed and 
11. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853), subsequent proceedings, Le Roy v. Tatham,
63 U.S. 132 (1859). 
12. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 172 (1853). 
13. Id. at 176. 
14. Id. at 171. 
15. See id. at 176.
16. Id. at 178.
17. Id. at 176. 
18. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175 (1853). 
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admittedly not new.19  The only claimed point of novelty was a newly 
discovered property of lead—a natural phenomenon.  This discovery 
was that lead, when wrought “under heat and pressure,” would re-unite 
and “heal as though it had never been divided.20  The patent claimed the 
formation of metal pipes using this discovery “in any . . . manner.”21   
Although this property of lead was newly discovered, it was not 
itself new.  Rather, this property of matter was a fundamental scientific 
truth that had always existed.22  The Court concluded that such a 
discovery could not be patented, because in essence it was a law of 
nature.23  The Court reasoned that scientific principles and natural 
phenomena—including other powers in nature like steam and 
electricity—were "open to all," and that granting one person the 
exclusive right to use such principles would discourage others from 
creating new and useful inventions that harnessed the same fundamental 
means.24  This would be “against the avowed policy of the patent laws” 
to encourage innovation.25  
In a subsequent proceeding, in equity, on the same patent, the 
Supreme Court reversed its holding, finding that the patent sufficiently 
described a new process.26  However, even in this subsequent decisions, 
the Supreme Court reiterated “that a patent cannot be taken out solely 
for an abstract philosophical principle—for instance, for any law of 
nature or any property of matter, apart from any mode of turning it to 
account.”27  Thus the Court created its first exception to Section 101. 
Since Le Roy, many patent applications claiming natural phenomena or 
laws of nature have been deemed patent-ineligible.  
B. Mathematical Expressions Of Laws Of Nature Are Not Patentable
In 1939, the Supreme Court added a second exception to Section
101: mathematical expressions of laws of nature.  In Mackay Radio & 
Telegraph Co., the Court considered a patent for a V-shaped antenna, 
19. See id. at 172, 176; id. at 183 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 178. 
21. Id. at 172.
22. Id. at 174–75. 
23. See id.; see also Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. at 137 (1859) (a patent will not be granted
“for any law of nature or any property of matter, apart from any mode of turning it to account.  
A mere discovery of such a principle is not an invention, in the patent-law sense of the term.”).  
24. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175 (1853). 
25. Id. 
26. Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. at 141 (1859) (“It is rare that so clear and satisfactory an
explanation is given to the machinery which performs the important functions above specified. 
We are satisfied that the patent is sustainable, and that the complainants are entitled to the 
relief claimed by them.”).  
27. Id. at 137. 
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which used a mathematical relationship between the angle of the two 
wires, their length, and the length of the radio wave produced “to obtain 
a highly directional, efficient and simple antenna system.”28  
Representative Claim 1 of the patent recited: 
A directional antenna comprising  
a pair of angularly disposed linear conductors  
said conductors being angularly disposed with respect to each other, 
each of a length including substantially a plurality of half wave 
lengths,  
means for exciting the radiators in phase opposition 
whereby standing waves of opposite instantaneous polarity are 
formed thereon  
whereby radiant action of the antenna is predominantly along the 
direction of the bisector of the angle formed by the conductors, and  
another pair of conductors parallel and similar to said first mentioned 
pair of conductors and  
spaced therefrom an odd number of quarter wave lengths measured 
in a direction along the bisector of the angle of the conductors.29 
This patent was based on “Abraham’s formula,” which the patent 
applicant did not invent, and which had been published in a scientific 
journal thirty years earlier.30  Expanding on its reasoning in Le Roy, the 
Court found that neither laws of nature nor mathematical expressions of 
laws of nature could be patented.31  The Court observed that Abraham's 
formula expressed a “scientific truth” about the mathematical 
relationship between an antenna’s angle of direction and the wave length 
and wire length.32  This mathematical relationship, like the laws of 
gravity, had always existed in nature, even if mankind had only more 
recently discovered it. 
The Court’s conclusion in Mackay was a natural and logical 
extension of Le Roy.  Many of the natural phenomena previously 
identified by the Supreme Court as patent-ineligible—such as steam, 
gravity, and electricity—can be expressed through mathematical 
equations.33  Thus, mathematical expressions of laws of nature should be 
28. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 91 (1939).
29. See U.S. Pat. No. 1,974,387, Cl. 1 (issued Sep. 18, 1934).
30. Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 93. 
31. Id. at 94.
32. Id. at 93–94. 
33. For example, the boiling point at which steam is created can be calculated for a given
pressure using something known as the Clausius-Clapeyron equation, and Newton's Universal 
Law of gravitation states that F = Gm1m2/r2, where F is the force due to gravity, between two 
masses (m1 and m2), which are a distance r apart, and G is the gravitational constant. 
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excluded from Section 101 patent-eligible subject matter, for all the 
same reasons laws of nature themselves are excluded.  
Importantly, however, the Mackay Court distinguished between 
non-patentable laws of nature and mathematical expressions thereof, on 
one hand, and patentable novel and useful structures created with the aid 
of scientific principles, on the other.34  The Court found that the patent 
at issue in Mackay claimed the latter, a novel and useful directional 
antenna created with the aid of Abraham’s formula.35  The Court 
narrowly construed the claims of the patent, finding that the claims 
covered protectable subject matter: “a V antenna having an angle double 
the Abraham angle and wires containing a multiple of half wave 
lengths.”36  
Thus, unlike the patent in Le Roy v. Tatham, the patent in Mackay 
did not claim all uses of a scientific principle, but instead “practically 
applie[d] the mathematical formula to configure a particular antenna.”37  
The point of novelty was not the formula itself, but the new, useful, and 
man-made radio antenna created using that formula—something that had 
not previously existed in nature.  
II. DEVELOPING THE “ABSTRACT IDEAS” EXCEPTION
In 1972, the Supreme Court, for the first time, added “abstract 
ideas” as a distinct exception to patent-eligible subject matter.  Although 
previous decisions, including Le Roy v. Tatham, had mentioned in dicta 
that “abstract principles” were not patentable, these prior cases defined 
abstract principles in terms of laws of nature, not as a separate category 
of exceptions.38  In Gottschalk v. Benson, however, the Supreme Court 
faced a challenge unlike any it had seen before—determining whether 
computer software constituted patentable subject matter.39  The patent at 
issue in Benson was directed to a computer algorithm for “converting 
binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”40  
Similarly, electrical power can be calculated as P = I × V = R × I2 = V2 ⁄ R, where power P is 
in watts, the resistance R is in ohms, the voltage V is in volts and the current I is in amperes.  
34. Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94.
35. Id. at 101–02.
36. Id. at 95.
37. Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74619, 74629
(Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-16/pdf/2014-29414.pdf; see 
also Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 102.  
38. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 137 (1859) (“[A] patent cannot be taken
out solely for an abstract philosophical principle—for instance, for any law of nature or any 
property of matter, apart from any mode of turning it to account.”) (emphasis added).  
39. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
40. Id. at 64. 
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Claim 8 of the patent, which is representative, recited: 
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form 
into binary which comprises the steps of 
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift
register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there
is a binary ‘1’ in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary ‘1’ in said second position of said
register,
(4) adding a binary ‘1’ to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a ‘1’ to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in
preparation for a succeeding binary ‘1’ in the second position of said
register.41
The Court held that this algorithm was not a protectable “process” 
under Section 101 of the patent act.42  Significantly, it also articulated, 
for the first time, the broad principle that "abstract intellectual concepts 
are not patentable."43 
The Benson analysis began predictably enough, quoting Mackay for 
the proposition that "a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of 
it, is not patentable invention."44  The Court proceeded, however, to 
expand on this proposition.  Instead of relying on existing Section 101 
precedent, the Court cited Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,45 claiming 
that each of the Section 101 exceptions discussed above arose from “the 
longstanding rule that ‘an idea of itself is not patentable.’ ” 46  Rubber-
Tip had rejected a patent on the grounds that the claimed idea was not 
novel—an issue arising under Section 102—not on the grounds that the 
idea was not patent-eligible under Section 101.47  Benson nonetheless 
41. Id. at 73–74.
42. Id. at 73. 
43. Id. at 67. 
44. Id. 
45. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). 
46. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (1972) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. at 507).
47. See Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. at 507 (“The idea of this patentee was a good one,
but his device to give it effect, though useful, was not new.  Consequently, he took nothing by 
his patent.”) (emphasis added).  
     Benson’s reliance on non-Section 101 cases to support a Section 101 rejection is primary 
reason for subsequent courts' confusion about the proper scope of a Section 101 analysis. 
Rubber Tip was a novelty case, yet is cited in many seminal Section 101 decisions.  Alice 
Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
185 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598–99 (1978) (Stewart, C.J., dissenting).  Thus, 
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imported Rubber Tip’s novelty arguments into the patent-eligible-
subject-matter context, using it to create a new “abstract ideas” exception 
and connecting laws of nature, mathematical expressions, and abstract 
ideas together on the grounds that all are “the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.”48  The Court reasoned that the “practical 
effect” of allowing the proposed patent would be to patent the entire 
“idea” of converting BCD numerals into pure binary.49  Finding that 
allowing such a patent “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical 
formula” and prevent its use by others for scientific innovation, the Court 
rejected the patent.50  
Six years later, the Supreme Court applied Benson in Parker v. 
Flook,51 another Section 101 case involving a computer algorithm. 
Flook rejected a patent for an algorithm to calculate an “alarm limit”:—
a number that determined the correct curing time for rubber and signals 
the time when the synthetic rubber molding press should open.52  Claim 
1 of the patent, which the Court found to be representative, described the 
method as follows: 
1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at
least one process variable involved in a process comprising the
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm
limit has a current value of
B0 + K 
wherein B0 is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm 
offset which comprises: 
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said
present value being defined as PVL;
many courts reject claims as patent-ineligible because they describe an idea that has long been 
used in society.  But this should lead to a Section 102, not Section 101 rejection. 
     Similarly, Benson and numerous subsequent decisions have relied on O’Reilly v. Morse, 
56 U.S. 62 (1853), to support Section 101 rejections.  See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty., 134 S. Ct. at 
2354; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204 n.22; 
Flook, 437 U.S. at 592; Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.  In Morse, the Supreme Court rejected a broad 
claim covering any use of electromagnetism for printing letters at a distance.  See Morse, 56 
U.S. at 112–21.  But the claim in Morse was rejected on enablement and description grounds, 
not patent-eligible subject matter grounds.  See id. at 113, 121 (“[T]he patent is illegal . . . 
because he claims more than he has sufficiently described.”).  However, based on Morse, 
courts have conflated “broad” claims with “abstract claims,” and thus found them patent-
ineligible.  But a proper reading of Morse would require most “broad” claims to be held 
patent-eligible, but inadequately descriptive.  
48. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
49. Id. at 71–72.
50. Id. at 72.
51. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585. 
52. Id. 
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(2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation:
B1 = B0(1.0—F) + PVL(F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 
1.0; 
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as B1 + K;
and thereafter
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.53
The patent examiner had rejected this claim because, like the claims
in Le Roy and Benson, the mathematical formula was the only point of 
novelty, and therefore the patented method “would in practical effect be 
a patent on the formula or mathematics itself.”54  The Supreme Court 
affirmed, noting that even if the mathematical formula had been novel, 
useful, and discovered by the inventor,55 it was nevertheless not patent-
eligible subject matter because a formula was “not the kind of 
‘discover[y]’ that the [patent] statute was enacted to protect.”56  After 
stating that “[t]he process itself—not merely the mathematical 
algorithm—must be new and useful,” and finding that the claimed 
process was neither new nor useful, the Court rejected the patent.57 
Only a few years later, however, the Supreme Court appeared to 
reverse course completely.  In Diamond v. Diehr,58 the Court addressed 
a patent very similar to one in Flook, which was again directed to a 
process for curing synthetic rubber using a mathematical formula and 
programmed digital computer.  Representative Claim 1 of the Diehr 
patent provided: 
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision
molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at 
least, 
natural logarithm conversion data (ln), 
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said 
compound being molded, and 
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of 
the press, 
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the 
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, 
53. Id. at 596–97.
54. Id. at 587.
55. See id. at 588. 
56. Id. at 593.
57. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978). 
58. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location 
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding, 
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z), 
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during 
each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, 
which is 
ln v = CZ + x 
where v is the total required cure time, 
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals 
during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time 
calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and 
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates 
equivalence.59 
Contrary to its decision in Flook, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Diehr patent claimed patent-eligible subject matter.  The decision 
acknowledged Le Roy, Mackay, Benson, and Flook, and noted that not 
every discovery constitutes patentable subject matter.60  But it also 
cautioned that courts should not find a claim drawn to nonstatutory 
subject matter “simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer 
program, or digital computer.”61  Relying on Mackay, the Court found 
that the patent at issue did not claim a mathematical formula, but instead 
claimed “a process of curing synthetic rubber” that “employ[ed] a well-
known mathematical equation . . . in conjunction with all of the other 
steps in the[] claimed process.”62  Because the claim was not drawn to a 
mathematical formula, but to an industrial process for the molding of 
rubber products, the claim satisfied the requirements of Section 101.63 
After Diehr, the Supreme Court nearly remained silent on the issue 
of Section 101 as it related to computer algorithms for nearly thirty years. 
But in 2010 it finally addressed the topic again.  In Bilski v. Kappos, the 
Court rejected a patent application directed to a series of steps for 
managing risk amongst buyers and sellers of commodities.  The Court 
found that the “key claims” were claims 1 and 4, and noted that, while 
Claim 1 described a series of steps instructing how to hedge risk, Claim 
4 put the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical 
formula.64  Claim 1 consisted of the following steps: 
59. Id. at 179 n.5.
60. See id. at 185, 188. 
61. Id. at 187. 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 192–93. 
64. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010). 
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(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said
consumers;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a
counter-risk position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that
said series of market participant transactions balances the risk
position of said series of consumer transactions.65
The Bilski Court declined to establish any bright-line rules that 
business methods or software algorithms were per se patent-ineligible, 
and instead chose to follow prior decisions on unpatentability.66  The 
Court “resolve[ed] th[e] case narrowly on the basis of th[e] Court’s 
decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr,” and held that the claims were 
not patentable processes because they were “attempts to patent abstract 
ideas.”67  Interestingly, the Bilski decision expressly linked mathematical 
expressions and abstract ideas, noting that "[t]he concept of hedging, 
described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, 
is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in 
Benson and Flook."68   
III. THE ALICE DECISION
In 2012, the Supreme Court created new guidelines for determining 
whether an invention constituted patent-eligible subject matter.  In Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,69 the Court 
addressed a patent apparently claiming a law of nature.70  To determine 
whether the claims added sufficient subject matter beyond the law of 
nature to render them patent-eligible, the Court established a two-step 
framework.  First, a court must determine whether the claims at issue are 
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as a law of nature.71  If the 
answer is yes, then the Court should determine whether there is any 
“inventive concept” that transforms the nature of the claims, individually 
65. Id.
66. Id. at 608. 
67. Id. at 609. 
68. Id. at 611–12. 
69. Mayo Collaborative Serv’s. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
70. See id. at 1296 (patent claimed relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove 
ineffective). 
71. See id. at 1297.
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and as an ordered combination, into a patent-eligible application.72 
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, extending application of the Mayo two-step test from “law of 
nature cases” to all Section 101 cases.73  Alice involved claims for “a 
computer-implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the 
risk that only one party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) 
by using a third-party intermediary.”74  A representative claim in Alice 
read: 
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each
party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange
institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of
predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for
each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory
institution from the exchange institutions;
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance
for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow
credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these
transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record
being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time,
each said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of
the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit
record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with
the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and
debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the
exchange institutions.75
Performing the Mayo analysis, the Court first found that the claims 
were drawn to the abstract idea of “intermediated settlement.”76  The 
Alice court acknowledged that it was, perhaps, stepping far afield from 
traditional Section 101 jurisprudence, noting that, “[a]lthough hedging 
is a longstanding commercial practice, it is a method of organizing 
human activity, not a truth about the natural world that has always 
existed.”77  Nevertheless, because “intermediated settlement” was no 
72. Id. at 1299.
73. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014). 
74. Id. at 2351–52. 
75. Id. at 2352 n.2. 
76. Id. at 2357.
77. Id. at 2356 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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less abstract than the risk hedging in Bilksi or decimal binary conversion 
in Benson, the Court found itself bound by precedent to hold that the 
claims were directed to a patent-ineligible concept beyond Section 101’s 
scope.78  
At the second step, the Court found that the addition of computer 
implementation was not a sufficient “inventive concept” to rescue the 
claims from being abstract.79  Because the applicant’s system and media 
claims added “nothing of substance” to the underlying abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement, the Court found all of the patent claims 
ineligible under Section 101.80  
IV. ALICE’S AFTERMATH
A. Impact On Software Patents
Alice was apparently seen as a “minor case” by the Supreme
Court81—and significantly, was not intended to be a software case. 
During oral argument, the Supreme Court was told—and accepted the 
representation that—“[Alice] ha[s] no software . . . they’ve never written 
software.”82  The claims in Alice were described as “a business method 
that just happen[ed] to be implemented in software.”83  The Court was 
also told its decision would not impact software patents.84  
As it turns out, Alice had a significant impact on software patents. 
Since Alice, the Federal Circuit has routinely rejected software patents 
on the grounds that they are patent-ineligible “abstract ideas.”85  From 
2014 to 2017, the Federal Circuit decided nearly sixty cases involving 
computer-implemented inventions,86 finding only seven of them patent-
78. Id. at 2350, 2356. 
79. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014). 
80. Id. at 2360. 
81. Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case,” 
Part 1, BILSKI BLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-
after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html (citing a tweet by Gatlin McArthur, 
@GatlinMcArthur, TWITTER (Aug. 15, 2015 3:05 PM), https://goo.gl/QymRX9, which 
claims an unnamed Supreme Court justice stated in conversation that the Court was not aware 
of the impact of Alice, that it was a “minor case,” and was “not intended to be game 
changing.”). 
82. Id. (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l., No. 13-298 Oral Argument
Transcript (“Alice Oral Argument”), (Mar. 31, 2014), p. 30). 
83. Id. 
84. Id.
85. See Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 534 (2015); Robert D. Swanson, Section 101 and
Computer-Implemented Inventions, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 161, 163 n.9 (2012). 
86. For the sake of brevity and relevance, this discussion does not consider or include all
cases decided by the Federal Circuit since Alice, in particular excludes cases relating to natural 
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eligible,87 and citing Alice to reject the remaining majority on Section 
101 grounds.  
A few statistics underscore Alice’s impact: 
• After Alice, the number of patent grants dropped for the
first time in seven years,88 with a “dramatic” impact on both
software and business method patents.89
• In the first six months after Alice, the number of newly filed
patents cases dropped by forty percent in 2014 as compared
to 2013.90
• Between 2010 and 2014, between seventeen and fifty
percent of rejections in the PTO’s “E-Commerce”
technology group, which evaluates software patents, were
Section 101 rejections. 91  Post-Alice, however, between
fifty-two percent and one hundred percent of E-commerce
group rejections were based on Section 101.92
• In the first two years following Alice, there were four times
as many district court decisions (247) on Section 101 issues
as in the four years preceding Alice (fifty-seven district
court decisions from 2010 to 2014).93
The high rates of rejection for computer-implemented inventions, 
based on confusing and seemingly arbitrary determinations of what 
counts as an “abstract idea,” discourage innovation, particularly in the 
software industry.94  Yet the exceptions to Section 101 were designed to 
phenomena and cases where a patent was found invalid under something other than the 
“abstract idea” exception.  See, e.g., AllVoice Developments US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp, 612 
F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 697 (2015) (finding voice recognition
software patent-ineligible for failing to recite either a process or a tangible, physical object,
so it was not it one of the four Section 101 categories).
87. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Enfish, 
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. 
v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F. App'x
1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
88. Kevin Penton, Patent Grants Dropped for First Time In 7 Years, Report Says,
LAW360 (May 17, 2016), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/797381. 
89. Sachs, Two Years After Alice, supra note 81. 
90. Tran, Software Patents, supra note 85 at 539. 
91. Robert R. Sachs, The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath Of #Alicestorm, BILSKI
BLOG (Jun. 20, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-year-anniversary-
the-aftermath-of-alicestorm.html. 
92. Id.
93. Sachs, Two Years After Alice, supra note 81. 
94. Cf. Jennifer Girod & Katherine Drabiak, A Proposal for Comprehensive Biobank
Research Laws to Promote Translational Medicine in Indiana, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 217, 
276 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:58 
encourage innovation by protecting the “building blocks of human 
ingenuity.”95  
Both Alice and Mayo recognized that lower courts must “tread 
carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of 
patent law,” because “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 
ideas.’ ” 96  
Yet the Federal Circuit and lower courts have used the “abstract 
idea” exception to do exactly that.  Unable to pin down a satisfactory 
definition of an “abstract idea,” courts have instead relied on dicta and 
created a number of glosses describing what is or is not patentable-
eligible subject matter.  But these shortcuts have led to predictably 
flawed conclusions.  Courts looking to Bilski, for example, have 
attempted to cite it for the proposition that economic practices are 
abstract ideas, because these business methods have existed for as long, 
or at least nearly as long, as laws of nature.97  But the Bilski Court 
explicitly rejected such a bright-line rule.98  Moreover, whether 
something has been around for a long time is a question of novelty—the 
223 (2008) (“Vague and inconsistent federal regulation of . . . research likely has a chilling 
effect on researchers and investors . . . .”); Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in 
Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, n.31 (2005) (“Predictability, both 
for patent owners and inventors, is paramount.”); Richard L. Robbins, Subtests of 
“Nonobviousness:” A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 
1171 n.16 (1964) (“[A]n unpredictable standard could still have a deterrent effect on 
innovation, for investors are faced with many more alternatives to research than are 
inventors.”). 
95. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Serv’s. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012)). 
96. Alice Corp. Pty., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct., at 1293–94).
97. See, e.g., Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x. 977, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(citing Bilski for the proposition that any “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in 
our system of commerce” is an abstract idea); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356–57 (acknowledging 
that, although intermediated settlement is “not a truth about the natural world that has always 
existed,” it was nevertheless “long prevalent” in human activity and no less abstract than the 
“risk hedging” in Bilkski); cf. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)  (rejecting claims for data collection, 
recognition, and storage because “humans have always performed these functions”). 
     Recently, the Federal Circuit has expanded its exceptions Section 101 even further, 
excluding not only longstanding economic practices but any longstanding “fundamental 
practice” from patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital 
One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting claims for information 
tailoring as “a fundamental . . . practice long prevalent in our system . . . .”) (alternations in 
original). 
98. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605–09 (2010). (“A categorical rule denying 
patent protection for “inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate 
the purposes of the patent law.” . . .  [R]ather than adopting categorical rules that might have 
wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of 
this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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domain of Section 102—not patentable subject matter under Section 
101.  
Mathematical expressions, once their own distinct category of 
potential exceptions to Section 101, have also been subsumed into the 
ever-expanding reach of the “abstract ideas” exception.99  Computer 
programs—which often rely on algorithms or mathematical 
expressions—have in turn been dragged down alongside mathematical 
expressions, and are now more often than not rejected as “abstract.”  The 
“abstract ideas” exception has even expanded to cover software 
programs that are entirely unrelated to mathematical expressions or laws 
of nature.  Since Alice the Federal Circuit has, for example, rejected 
patents on software for automatically migrating an individual’s preferred 
computer settings to a new computer system in the course of an 
upgrade,100 organizing digital photographs uploaded from a cell 
phone,101 and determining pixel colors to more accurately show light, 
shadows, or translucent textures in an electronic image, such as images 
used by Pixar in its digitally animated movies.102  Even claims for online 
restaurant menus,103 digital Bingo games,104 and internet advertisement 
systems105 have been rejected, although these inventions can hardly be 
considered “building blocks of human ingenuity” or “basic tools” of 
scientific and technological innovation. These modern inventions must 
be contrasted with earlier Section 101 cases, which rejected claims 
covering electromagnetism,106 strains of bacteria,107 and the 
mathematical relationship between binary and decimal binary 
99. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). (“Mathematical formulas are a type of abstract idea.”); DDR Holdings, LLC v. 
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Mathematical algorithms, including 
those executed on a generic computer, are abstract ideas.”); Interim Guidance on Patent 
Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74619, 74622 (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-16/pdf/2014-29414.pdf (“[M]athematical 
formulas are considered to be an exception as they express a scientific truth, but have been 
labelled by the courts as both abstract ideas and laws of nature.”). 
100. See Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., 664 F. App’x 968, 969 (Fed. Cir.
2016). 
101. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 609 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
102. See Coffelt v. NVIDIA Corp., No. CV1600457SJOKKX, 2016 WL 7507763, at *1
(C.D. Cal. June 21, 2016), aff'd, 680 F. App’x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2143 (2017). 
103. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
104. See Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
105. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
106. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854). Although Morse should be read as an
enablement and description case, not a Section 101 case, see discussion supra note 41, it is 
cited so often by courts as a Section 101 case that it would be remiss not to mention it here. 
107. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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numbers108—all of which are much more necessary tools for scientific 
innovation. 
The Federal Circuit has also resorted to dangerously broad 
generalizations, such as that any “process that employs mathematical 
algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional 
information is not patent eligible.”109  Glosses such as this have the 
potential to rule out large numbers of new and useful computer-
implemented inventions.  For example, data compression is arguably 
nothing more than a process of manipulating existing information (for 
example, a high-definition video file) using a mathematical algorithm 
(the compression algorithm) to generate additional information (a 
smaller video file).  This is an important area of computer improvement, 
yet current Federal Circuit glosses could exclude valuable developments 
in the field from patent protection.  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated since Alice that 
“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of 
the collection and analysis” is an abstract idea.110  Yet digital cameras, 
televisions, and even cell phone towers arguably do nothing more than 
collect information, analyze it, and display certain results.  Many 
inventions that have already been found patent-eligible—including the 
lip-synching software recently found to be patent-eligible by the Federal 
Circuit in McRO111—could just as easily have been found patent-
ineligible on the grounds that they can be characterized as taking existing 
information, applying a mathematical algorithm, and creating additional 
information.  The current uncertainty between patent-eligible and patent-
ineligible subject matter has serious repercussions, including 
inefficiency and reduced incentives to innovate.  Courts should not allow 
the boundaries of Section 101 to become so nebulous that they could 
eliminate most patent protection in the software space. 
B. Confusion And Contradictions
Beyond its regrettable effect on software patents in particular, Alice
created widespread confusion and uncertainty regarding the boundaries 
108. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
109. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). 
110. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also, e.g., Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Content 
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351; Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715. 
111. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2016). 
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beyond which a patent claim becomes directed to an abstract idea.112  The 
PTO released two memoranda in 2014 attempting to provide guidance 
on implementing Alice,113 but these memoranda noted that abstract ideas 
are most often identified “by way of example, including fundamental 
economic practices, certain methods of organizing human activities, an 
idea ‘of itself,’ and mathematical relationships/ formulas,”114 
demonstrating the struggle to provide meaningful limitations to the 
abstract ideas exception. 
Courts continue to struggle with this exception.  The Federal Circuit 
noted in 2016 that there is no “single, succinct, usable definition or test” 
for what constitutes an abstract idea.115  In other words, abstract ideas 
have become akin to obscenity: courts simply have to know it when they 
see it.116 In other contexts the courts have regularly found such tests, 
which can be “inconsistently and unpredictably applied,” to be 
“unacceptable.”117 
112. See, e.g., Clear with Computers, LLC v. Altec Indus., Inc., No. 6:14-CV-79, 2015
WL 993392, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2015), aff'd, 636 F. App'x 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
contours are often unclear between those inventions that are directed to an abstract idea and 
those that are not.”); Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (D. 
Del. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 626 F. App’x 1010 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he requirements of § 101 as applied to this area of technology have been 
a moving target, from the complete rejection of patentability for computer programs to the 
much broader enunciation of the test . . . [that] a computer-implemented invention was 
considered patent-eligible so long as it produced a useful, concrete and tangible result.”) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
113. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirschfield, Deputy Comm’r of the U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off. to Patent Examiners (Jun. 25, 2014), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf; 
Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74619, 74619 (Dec. 16, 
2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-16/pdf/2014-29414.pdf. 
114. Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74619, 74622 
(Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-16/pdf/2014-29414.pdf.  
115. Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
see also, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1150–51 (Fed. Cir. 
2016), cert. denied sub nom., Sypnosys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 16–1288, 2017 
WL 1539155 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2017) (“We recognize that defining the precise abstract idea of 
patent claims in many cases is far from a “straightforward” exercise . . . [and] the contours of 
what constitutes an inventive concept are far from precise.”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP 
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016) (“The 
third exception—abstract ideas—is more of a problem, a problem inherent in the search for a 
definition of an ‘abstract idea’ that is not itself abstract.”). 
116. Cf. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
117. See Brainers & Bridges v. Weingeroff Enter., Inc., No. 85 C 493, 1986 WL 8388, at
*7–8 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1986) (holding “episode” test amounted to “I know it when I see it”
approach, and finding “such a vague and unpredictable test unacceptable”); see also In re
Scheer, 819 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting “I know it when I see it approach” leads
to “predictably unpredictable results”); NetworkIP, LLC v. F.C.C., 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (warning that “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” poses “the danger of arbitrariness” and
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In the absence of a clear definition, the Federal Circuit has relied 
on everything from common-law analogies118 to bright-line rules119 to 
decide whether a claimed invention is directed to a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea.  Some cases consider whether the claims recite “well-
understood, routine conventional activit[ies]” using “generic-computer 
functions,”120 while others have found that even generic features, when 
viewed as an ordered combination, can create a patent-eligible 
invention.121  Some decisions rely only on claim language,122 while 
others allow a claim analysis to be informed by the specification.123  Still 
others continue to look to the “machine-or-transformation test” as a 
“useful clue,”124 while others now disfavor it.125  And some courts focus 
abuse of discretion). 
118. Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1295 (using “the classic common law methodology” of
“examin[ing] earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what 
prior cases were about, and which way they were decided”); see also, e.g., Versata, 793 F.3d 
at 1334 (analogizing claims to other “similar claims [found] to be ineligible”).   
119. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (noting that test for patent-eligibility of computer software is whether claims are 
“necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically 
arising in the realm of computer networks”); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (test for patent-eligibility of computer software is whether claims are 
“directed to an improvement to computer functionality”).  
120. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
essentially result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a frequent feature 
of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in the area of using generic computer and 
network technology to carry out economic transactions.”); LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 
656 F. App’x 991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“At best, the claim describes the automation of a 
fundamental economic concept . . . through the use of generic-computer functions.  It is well 
settled, though, that automating conventional activities using generic technology does not 
amount to an inventive concept.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
121. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2016); cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (“[A] new combination 
of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination 
were well known and in common use before the combination was made.”).  
122. See, e.g., Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Digitech's position is not supported by the claim language.”); 
Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1149 (“While Synopsys may be correct that the inventions of the 
Gregory Patents were intended to be used in conjunction with computer-based design tools, 
the Asserted Claims are not confined to that conception.  The § 101 inquiry must focus on the 
language of the Asserted Claims themselves.”). 
123. See, e.g., Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1299 (“In addition to taking into consideration the
approved claim constructions, we examine the claims in light of the written description.”) 
(citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335 (applying step one involves considering the claims "in light 
of the specification")); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611–15 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (examining the claims in light of the written description under steps one and two). 
124. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
125. See, e.g., Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 F.
App'x 914, 919 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2390 (2016) (“[P]ost-Mayo/Alice, 
[the machine-or-transformation test] is no longer sufficient to render a claim patent-eligible.”). 
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on whether there are concrete means to achieve a distinct end,126 while 
others have explicitly rejected the “means/ends” approach.127 
The sheer multitude of competing tests and contradictory dicta has 
predictably led to inconsistent decision-making.  
In Enfish, for example, the Federal Circuit found that a “logical 
model for a computer database” was patent-eligible because it was 
“designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in 
memory.”128  Representative Claim 17 of the patent at issue provided: 
A data storage and retrieval system for a computer memory, 
comprising: 
means for configuring said memory according to a logical table, said 
logical table including: 
a plurality of logical rows, each said logical row including an object 
identification number (OID) to identify each said logical row, each 
said logical row corresponding to a record of information; 
a plurality of logical columns intersecting said plurality of logical 
rows to define a plurality of logical cells, each said logical column 
including an OID to identify each said logical column; and 
means for indexing data stored in said table.129 
The decision prefaced its holding by stating: 
We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all improvements in 
computer-related technology are inherently abstract and, therefore, 
must be considered at step two.  Indeed, some improvements in 
computer-related technology when appropriately claimed are 
undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED 
display, and the like.  Nor do we think that claims directed to 
software, as opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract and 
therefore only properly analyzed at the second step of the Alice 
analysis.  Software can make non-abstract improvements to 
computer technology just as hardware improvements can, and 
126. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269–71 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1596 (2017) (rejecting claims that described a desired 
function, but not a specific means for performing that function, and noting that purely 
functional claims have been frequently held ineligible under Section 101); see also Elec. 
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (noting “an important common-sense distinction between ends 
sought and particular means of achieving them, between desired results (functions) and 
particular ways of achieving (performing) them” and that the “result-focused, functional 
character” of the claims rendered them patent-ineligible). 
127. See Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1295 (“The dissent focuses on the difference between
‘means’ and ‘ends.’ . . . We commend the dissent for seeking a creative way of incorporating 
aspects of well-known doctrine in the search for what is an ‘abstract idea,’ but that is not now 
the law, either in statute or in court decision [sic].”). 
128. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
129. Id. at 1336. 
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sometimes the improvements can be accomplished through either 
route.  We thus see no reason to conclude that all claims directed to 
improvements in computer-related technology, including those 
directed to software, are abstract and necessarily analyzed at the 
second step of Alice, nor do we believe that Alice so directs.130  
The decision found that “the plain focus of the claims is on an 
improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other 
tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.”  Thus, the 
claims were not directed to an abstract idea within the meaning of 
Alice.131  The court disagreed with the district court’s characterization of 
the claims as directed to the abstract idea of “organizing information 
using tabular formats,” finding that “the claims are not simply directed 
to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically directed 
to a self-referential table for a computer database.”132  It also noted that 
claims and specification revealed benefits over conventional databases, 
such as increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory 
requirements.133  Because the claims were not directed to an abstract idea 
under step one of the Alice analysis, the court declined to proceed to step 
two of that analysis.134  
By contrast, the Federal Circuit’s decision in TLI found that an 
improved method of “classifying and storing digital images in organized 
manner” was directed to the abstract idea of “classifying an image and 
storing the image based on its classification.”135  A representative claim 
in TLI provided: 
17. A method for recording and administering digital images,
comprising the steps of:
recording images using a digital pick up unit in a telephone unit, 
storing the images recorded by the digital pick up unit in a digital 
form as digital images, 
transmitting data including at least the digital images and 
classification information to a server, wherein said classification 
information is prescribable by a user of the telephone unit for 
allocation to the digital images, 
receiving the data by the server, 
extracting classification information which characterizes the digital 
images from the received data, and 
130. Id. at 1335.
131. Id. at 1336.
132. Id. at 1337.
133. Id.
134. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. 
135. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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storing the digital images in the server, said step of storing taking 
into consideration the classification information.136 
The court found that the claims were “not directed to a specific 
improvement to computer functionality.  Rather, they are directed to the 
use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known 
environment, without any claim that the invention reflects an inventive 
solution to any problem presented by combining the two.”137  The court 
further found that the claims did not disclose any “inventive concept,” 
because the components recited in the claims were merely generic, such 
as a “telephone unit” and a “server.”138  The court rejected the patent as 
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and concluded that “steps that 
generically spell out . . . apply it on a telephone network . . . cannot 
confer patent eligibility.”139  
The Court in Alice warned that a determination of patent eligibility 
should not “depend simply on the draftsman’s art,”140 yet this appears to 
be exactly the result of many post-Alice decisions.  If a competent 
draftsman—or skillful attorney—can convince a court that the claims are 
directed improving computer functionality, the claim is found patent-
eligible; if an opposing party can convince the court that the claims lack 
an inventive concept, the claims are rejected as patent ineligible.  
Enfish and TLI, for instance, both involved claims directed to the 
same “abstract idea”: improved storage and management of digital 
objects.  And Enfish’s claimed “means for indexing data” stored in the 
self-referential table are conceptually indistinguishable from TLI's 
“storing the digital images in the server . . . taking into consideration the 
classification information.”141  The inventions in both Enfish and TLI  
could be implemented using generic components, such as a computer or 
mobile phone uploaded with the correct software.  Both patents were 
directed to solving the same technological problem: efficient data 
storage.  Just as the patent in Enfish allowed for “faster searching of 
data,” “more effective storage of data,” and “more flexibility” in 
configuring the data than traditional models,142 the invention in TLI 
sought to “provid[e] for recording, administration and archiving of 
digital images simply, fast and in such way that the information therefore 
136. Id. at 610.
137. Id. at 612.
138. Id. at 613.
139. Id. at 615.
140. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014) (quoting Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)). 
141. Compare Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 
with In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
142. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1333. 
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may be easily tracked.”143  And just as the organizational structure in 
Enfish was designed to reduce the “extensive modeling and 
configuration” required by prior art databases,144 the organizational 
structure in TLI was designed to reduce “the problems of locating the 
data of an image data file[, which] increase as the number of images to 
be archived increases.”145  
But instead of applying Section 101 consistently, one court’s 
improvement to computer functionality is another court’s abstract idea, 
leading to seemingly arbitrary results.  
V. CORRECTING COURSE
Countless commentators have agreed that post-Alice Section 101 
jurisprudence is unworkable.  So how can courts get back on track?  The 
solution is to look behind Alice to Le Roy, Mackay, Benson, Flook, 
Diehr, and Bilski, and to return Section 101 to its roots. 
A. Reconciling “Abstract Ideas” And “Laws Of Nature”
At first glance, it may not seem that Benson, Flook, and Bilski are
of much assistance in crafting a workable definition of “abstract ideas.”  
These cases seem to stand for the proposition that an abstract idea can 
be anything from an industrial process to a computer program to a 
business method—a wide range of inventions, all made by man. 
Moreover, these cases hardly seem less contradictory than the cases 
following Alice. Flook and Diehr, in particular, have been criticized for 
appearing to reach diametrically opposed results on seemingly identical 
subject matter.  Yet the Supreme Court has not overruled either Flook or 
Diehr, and lower courts continue to rely on both cases as good law.  So 
how can these seemingly disparate cases be reconciled?  
The answer lies in the claims.  Patent law looks to a patent’s claims, 
not its specification, to determine the scope of the patent.146  The 
specifications in Benson, Flook, and Bilski may have all been directed 
broadly to computer programs, industrial processes, or business 
methods, but when the claims themselves are read closely, a common 
thread appears: all of the claims were directed to math.  More precisely, 
each of the patents in Benson, Flook, and Bilski claimed a mathematical 
expression of a law of nature. 
143. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
144. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1333. 
145. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 609–10 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
146. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 956 F. Supp. 2d 925, 936 (N.D.
Ill. 2013); Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1942). 
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Benson presents the clearest case study.  In fact, Benson could have 
been decided without creating the “abstract ideas” exception at all.  The 
Supreme Court could have rejected the claims because the mathematical 
conversion between a BCD number and its pure binary counterpart is the 
same kind of "scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it," as 
the unpatentable mathematical relationship observed by the Court in 
Mackay.147  Alternatively, having found that the proposed algorithm 
used the same “ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use” only in a 
different order, “[could] also be performed without a computer,” and 
“c[ould] be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new 
machinery being necessary,”148 the Court could have found that such 
basic arithmetic was obvious or lacked novelty under Sections 102 and 
103.149  Regardless of the Court’s stated reasons, Benson was correctly 
decided, not because computer algorithms are “abstract ideas,” but 
because the mathematical relationship between pure binary and decimal 
binary is a fundamental scientific principle, and the algorithm the Benson 
patent claimed was merely a mathematical expression of that law of 
nature.  
Flook initially appears more complex, but examining the claims at 
issue, its rationale similarly becomes apparent.  The claims in Flook were 
directed to calculating a specific number, called an alarm limit.150  A 
method for calculating a specific number is also known as a 
mathematical formula.  Thus, Flook, like Benson, could have been 
decided without invoking abstract ideas at all, instead relying on the 
“laws of nature” exclusion.  Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in a 
footnote that the petitioner’s algorithm revealed an underlying 
“scientific principle” that always existed, just as “Newton’s formulation 
of the law of universal gravitation . . . according to the equation 
F=mm′/d<2> . . . always existed—even before Newton announced his 
celebrated law.”151  The Flook patent claimed nothing more than a 
process for obtaining a particular number by inputting particular values 
into a particular mathematical equation.  That a mathematical formula 
will reliably yield a specified numerical output given a specified 
numerical input is a quintessential patent-ineligible scientific principle.  
Even the claims in Bilski were directed to a mathematical 
147. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
148. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
149. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 n.14 (1978) (“Sections 102 and 103 establish
certain conditions, such as novelty and nonobviousness, to patentability.”). 
150. Id. at 585 (“An ‘alarm limit’ is a number.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 
(1981). 
151. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15.
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expression of a law of nature, despite the Court’s description of the 
claims as directed to “the abstract idea of hedging risk.”152  The first 
critical observation regarding the claims in Bilski is that, although Claim 
1 was primarily discussed in the Supreme Court’s decision, the Court 
also noted that Claim 4 put the concept articulated in Claim 1 into a 
simple mathematical formula.153  This mathematical formula used 
“historical costs and weather variables” along with “economic and 
statistical formulas, to analyze these data and to estimate the likelihood 
of certain outcomes.”154  Claim 4 of the Bilski patent application recited: 
The method of claim 3 wherein the fixed price for the consumer 
transaction is determined by the relationship: 
Fixed Bill Price = Fi + [(Ci + Ti + LD1) x (α + βE(Wi)] 
wherein, 
Fi = fixed costs in period i; 
Ci = variable costs in period i; 
Ti = variable long distance transportation costs in period i; 
LDi = variable local delivery costs in period i; 
E(Wi) = estimated location-specific weather indicator in period i; 
and α and β are constants.155 
Reviewing this claim, Bilski was plainly decided correctly.  Bilski, 
like Flook, merely claimed a mathematical expression of a law of 
nature—namely that, given particular inputs to the equation “Fi + [(Ci + 
Ti + LD1) x (α + βE(Wi)]” a particular output would result.  Bilski’s 
method of balancing risk within a series of consumer transactions156 was 
in reality a method of balancing a mathematical equation.  Thus, Bilski 
does not stand for the proposition that business methods and long-
standing economic practices are “abstract ideas;” it means that business 
methods and other long-standing economic practices that are, in essence, 
mathematical expressions of laws of nature are patent-ineligible.  
Understanding Benson, Flook, and Bilski also provides an easier 
152. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010).
153. See id. at 611 (“The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a
mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at 
issue in Benson and Flook.”).  
154. Id. at 615.
155. See U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 10, 1997), 
http://www.ustpo.gov/go/com/sol/2007-1130bilski_joint_appendix.pdf. 
156. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599. 
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method for explaining the Court’s contrary decision in Diehr.  Although 
the claims in both Flook and Diehr included repeatedly recalculating a 
number based on a given formula, the claims in Diehr had one small but 
crucial distinction—upon determining that the number output by the 
formula was equivalent to a desired result, the press opened 
automatically.  Thus, the claims in Diehr were not directed only to 
calculating a number, as the claims in Flook were, but to achieving an 
man-made result—opening a press door—upon input of that number. 
This distinction may seem technologically minor, but it is crucial to 
Section 101 jurisprudence.  Diehr distinguishes between patents that 
only claim a mathematical expression of a law of nature, on one hand, 
and patents that use mathematical expressions that either do not reflect a 
law of nature or that accomplish some man-made result, on the other. 
This same distinction was the crux of Mackay: the distinction between 
patenting the Abraham’s formula itself, and patenting a novel and useful 
structure—a directional radio antenna—created with the aid of the 
Abraham’s formula.  
B. Applying The Test
By returning to a clear delineation between (a) patent-
ineligible laws of nature and mathematical expressions thereof, and (b) 
patent-eligible novel and useful inventions made by man, courts can 
reject patents for technological advances that would truly monopolize a 
tool a scientific innovation while still encouraging innovation in the 
computer and software industries.  
Under this approach, courts should reject only those patents 
claiming laws of nature or mathematical expressions thereof—such as 
those in Benson, Flook, and Bilski—and allow all other claims through 
the Section 101 “gateway” as patent-eligible subject matter.  If a claim 
is directed to something that is man-made, the product of human 
ingenuity, it should pass the Section 101 test.  It should not matter if 
what is “man-made” is a formula or an algorithm, as long as the formula 
or algorithm is not a representation of nature or a fundamental scientific 
principle.  
Courts will, of course, need to be careful to distinguish between 
“claims containing math” and claims encompassing a mathematical 
expression of a law of nature.  Otherwise, just as all inventions, at some 
level, “embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas,”157 nearly all computer-implemented 
inventions, and in fact nearly everything in the universe can, at some 
157. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
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level, be expressed with math.158  Yet, just as not all computer algorithms 
using math are abstract, not all mathematical expressions are 
mathematical expressions of laws of nature.159  
Consistent with our recommended approach, in at least two recent 
cases the Federal Circuit has reached conclusions recognizing that 
software, even though based on a mathematical expression, can 
nevertheless be patent-eligible subject matter.   
In McRO,160 for example, the Federal Circuit held that that claims 
reciting "a specific asserted improvement in computer animation" for 
lip-synching (matching an animated character’s lips and facial 
expression to its associated speech) were not directed to an unpatentable 
abstract idea.161  Whereas prior art methods were done manually by 
artists and were a highly subjective process, the claimed invention in 
McRO automated the process by using “specific, limited mathematical 
rules”162 to determine “morph weight sets as a function of the timing of 
phoneme sub-sequences.”163 
Reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit found that the 
claimed invention was not directed to an abstract idea.164  The court 
further noted that, although the claimed invention used a mathematical 
algorithm, the claims nevertheless were patent-eligible because they did 
not merely invoke generic processes and machinery, and instead focused 
on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation, provided 
automatic use of rules of particular type that a human animator likely 
would not have utilized, and the claimed techniques did not preempt 
approaches that used rules of different structure or different 
techniques.165  McRO also warned that “courts ‘must be careful to avoid 
oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally and failing to 
account for the specific requirements of the claims,” and noted that the 
158. Cf. Max Tegmark, Everything in the Universe Is Made of Math – Including You,
DISCOVER (Nov. 4, 2013), http://discovermagazine.com/2013/dec/13-math-made-flesh; Max 
Tegmark, Do We Live Inside a Mathematical Equation?, SCIENCE (Feb. 16, 2013), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2013/02/do-we-live-inside-mathematical-equation. 
159. See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794–95 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“Scientific principles, such
as the relationship between mass and energy, and laws of nature, such as the acceleration of 
gravity, namely, a = 32ft./sec. 2, can be represented in mathematical format.  However, some 
mathematical algorithms and formulae do not represent scientific principles or laws of nature; 
they represent ideas or mental processes and are simply logical vehicles for communicating 
possible solutions to complex problems.”).  
160. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
161. Id. at 1314. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1313. 
164. Id. at 1313, 1316.
165. Id. at 1313–16. 
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patent did not merely “automate a task previously performed by 
humans.”166 
Similarly, in Thales,167 the Federal Circuit found that an improved 
inertial tracking system for tracking the motion of an object relative to a 
moving reference frame was not directed to an abstract idea, and thus 
constituted patent-eligible subject matter.168  The patent at issue was 
directed to inertial sensors, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, 
which measure the specific forces associated with changes in a sensor’s 
position and orientation relative to a known starting position, and are 
used in a wide variety of applications, including aircraft navigation and 
virtual reality simulations.169  Prior art conventional solutions were 
flawed, however, and produced inconsistent position information when 
a moving platform accelerated or turned.170  The Thales invention, 
instead of using the conventional approach, required the platform (e.g., 
vehicle) inertial sensors to directly measure the gravitational field in the 
platform frame, and the object (e.g., helmet) inertial sensors to then 
calculate position information relative to the frame of the moving 
platform.  This system increased tracking accuracy, reduced the amount 
of hardware required, and allowed for simpler installation.171  
The Federal Circuit found that these claims were not directed to the 
abstract idea of using “mathematical equations for determining the 
relative position of a moving object to a moving reference frame,” as the 
lower court found, but instead were directed to “systems and methods 
that use inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors 
in measuring the relative position and orientation of a moving object on 
a moving reference frame.”172  The court clarified that just because “a 
mathematical equation is required to complete the claimed method and 
system does not doom the claims to abstraction.”173  The court 
acknowledged that, “[w]hile the claims utilize mathematical equations 
to determine the orientation of the object relative to the moving reference 
frame,” the equations were “a consequence of the arrangement of the 
sensors and the unconventional choice of reference frame in order to 
calculate position and orientation,” and the patent did not attempt to 
claim the equations themselves.174 
166. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313–14.
167. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
168. Id. at 1349. 
169. Id. at 1344–45. 
170. Id. at 1345. 
171. Id.
172. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States 850 F.3d 1343, 1348–1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
173. Id. at 1349.
174. Id. at 1348–49. 
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McRO and Thales were sensibly decided because neither of these 
inventions claimed laws of nature or mathematical expressions thereof. 
Whether animated lip-synching and improved inertial tracking are 
“abstract ideas” is irrelevant. Although McRO’s lip-synching technology 
relied on a mathematical relationship between an animated character’s 
facial expression and the sound the character was making, this function 
is not a law of nature.  The mathematical relationship used in McRO is 
not some fundamental truth; it did not exist in nature prior to the 
discovery or invention of animation.  Similarly, although Thales used 
pre-existing math and laws of physics to more accurately track the 
motion of two objects moving together, the particular algorithms defined 
an artificially created relationship between a man-made vehicle and a 
man-made helmet using man-made sensors, not a mathematical 
expression of a law of nature.  Thus, like the inventions in McKay and 
Diehr, the patents in McRO and Thales claimed novel and useful 
inventions made by man, created with the aid of laws of nature and the 
mathematical expressions thereof. 
Other recent cases, we submit, were not decided in a manner 
consistent with longstanding precedent.  TLI, discussed in section 0 
above, for example, would likely have reached a different result if the 
standards set forth in Enfish had been applied.  The Federal Circuit’s 
2017 decision in RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.175 provides a further 
case study.  In Recognicorp, the Federal Circuit rejected a patent directed 
to method for creating “a composite facial image using constituent parts” 
as abstract.176  In the prior art, composite facial images typically were 
stored in file formats such as “bitmap,” “gif,” or “jpeg.”  But these file 
formats required significant memory, and compressing the images often 
resulted in decreased image quality.  Digital transmission of these 
images could be difficult.  The claimed invention “sought to solve this 
problem by encoding the image at one end through a variety of image 
classes that required less memory and bandwidth, and at the other end 
decoding the images.”177  The Federal Circuit, however, found the claims 
“directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding image data,” by 
assigning image codes to the images through an interface using a 
mathematical formula, and then reproducing the image based on the 
codes.178  The court described the claims as directed to “a method 
whereby a user starts with data, codes that data using ‘at least one 
175. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1326. 
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multiplication operation,’ and ends with a new form of data.”179  The 
decision concluded that “[a]dding one abstract idea (math) to another 
abstract idea (encoding and decoding) does not render the claim non-
abstract.”180 
Recognicorp illustrates a recurring problem with current Section 
101 jurisprudence, which is too quick to write off all claims involving 
mathematical expressions as abstract.  The mathematical relationship 
between one (man-made) image of a person’s face and a similar (man-
made) image with a smaller file size is not a law of nature.  Nor is an 
algorithm for transforming one man-made image into another a 
mathematical expression of a law of nature, even if it involves 
multiplication.  Compressing and transforming images are man-made 
processes.  There are numerous different equations that can be used to 
compress or transform an image depending on subjective determinations 
of “image quality,” or more objective determinations of file size and 
memory use.  Two inventors might come up with two entirely different 
algorithms—both using math—to encode and decode an image, and both 
inventors might argue that their algorithm does so most efficiently. 
These man-made processes, used to determine the best way to encode, 
submit, or transform a man-made image (for varying values of “best”) 
should, in keeping with historical precedent, be patent-eligible subject 
matter.181 
Yet the Federal Circuit rejected the claims in RecogniCorp, and 
other similar claims in other cases, despite the fact such claims were 
directed to new and useful methods and processes.182  The mathematical 
equations used in many of the claims rejected by the Federal Circuit were 
expressions of man-made constructs, not expressions of laws of nature. 
The mathematical relationship between, for example, an image taken by 
a digital camera, and the image output by a printer or monitor183 did not 
previously exist in nature, and would not exist but for a human beings 
inventing both cameras and printers.  Thus, such claims should satisfy 
179. Id. at 1327. 
180. Id.
181. Consider, for example, the number of patents relating to the H.264 video 
compression codec, http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/AVC/Documents/avc-att1.pdf, 
and the development of competing compression algorithms, such as Google’s VP9 codec. 
182. See also, e.g., Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting claims directed to creating an improved “device profile” 
by combining data sets, finding that “[t]he device profile, as claimed, is a collection of 
intangible color and spatial information,” concluding that claims were directed to the abstract 
idea of “of organizing information through mathematical correlations”).  
183. See U.S. Patent No. 6,128,415, at 1:14–31 (issued Oct. 3, 2000) (patent at issue in
Digitech).  
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Section 101’s definition of patent-eligible subject matter, given the 
broad intent for Section 101 to cover “anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”184 
CONCLUSION 
Section 101 and its exceptions have a storied history dating back 
nearly two centuries.  Together they were crafted to ensure a careful 
balance between encouraging innovation, on the one hand, and leaving 
free important “scientific truths” to be used by all mankind, on the other. 
The recent rise of the “abstract ideas” exception has turned Section 
101 on its head.  Courts are now wielding Section 101 as a mechanism 
to prevent patenting in the computer and software industries, or at best 
are engendering uncertainty about patentability in those fields, broadly 
discouraging beneficial investment and innovation.  Section 101 was 
never supposed to have these effects.  It was intended as a simple 
“threshold test”185 and was purposefully given a broad scope subject to 
only a few, narrow exceptions.186  
184. This is not to say all software claims found patent-eligible by the Federal Circuit
should ultimately be found patentable.  Many software claims should be invalidated at some 
point.  Thus, even if most software claims pass through the Section 101 gateway—as this 
article proposes they should—a court should still properly reject them if they fail to satisfy 
the statutory requirements of Section 102 (novelty), Section 103 (nonobviousness), or Section 
112 (enablement and description). 
     For example, claims found “abstract” under the current framework due to lack of 
specificity should instead be rejected under Section 112.  See, e.g., Vehicle Intelligence & 
Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 F. App'x 914, 917–18 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2390 (2016) (“Much of Vehicle Intelligence’s briefing centers on the use 
of an ‘expert system’ that improves over the prior art . . . . But neither the claims at issue nor 
the specification provide any details as to how this ‘expert system’ works.”).  
     Similarly, claims found “abstract” because they implemented routine and well-known 
methods on a computer would fail under Section 103.  See, e.g., Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS 
LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting claims that recited only “generic 
functions of . . . verifying a chosen set of bingo numbers against a winning set of bingo 
numbers” using a computer).   
     Finally, most “business method” patents currently rejected as abstract would instead fail 
under Section 102.  See, e.g., Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 
1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting claims directed to computer-aided methods and systems for 
providing financing, finding that financing a purchase is a “fundamental economic practice 
long prevalent in our system of commerce”). Cf. U.S. Credit Sys. Co. v. Am. Credit Indem. 
Co., 53 F. 818, 819 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 59 F. 139 (2d Cir. 1893) (“But plans of 
indemnity against losses or parts of losses from casualty or misfortune by contracts of 
insurance or indemnity in various forms were in common use before, and not, in any sense, 
novel.  Besides this, the terms of contracts rest in the agreements of those making them, and 
coming to such agreements is not a new art.”). 
185. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). 
186. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“In choosing such expansive
terms [for Section 101] . . . modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”). 
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The solution proposed by this article, if followed, would provide 
courts, litigants, and the Patent Office a path back to a far more 
predictable and efficient regime.  And importantly, this solution can be 
implemented through judicial interpretation, without the need for 
legislation or reversal of the Alice decision.  Lower courts must simply 
follow the Supreme Court’s historical guidance, rather than the more 
recent throng of overbroad glosses on what constitutes an “abstract 
idea.”  Claims directed to software and other computer-implemented 
inventions, the bulk of which are unrelated to business methods of the 
sort considered in Alice, can continue to be evaluated in light of Benson, 
Flook, and Bilski, and in keeping with Diehr’s recognition that claims 
are not drawn to nonstatutory subject matter simply because they use a 
mathematical formula, computer program, or computer.187 
By returning the exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter to their 
roots—namely, by once again limiting them to laws of nature and 
mathematical expressions thereof—patent law will preserve the building 
blocks of scientific and technological development while still 
encouraging innovation in the digital age. 
187. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
